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bottom of the distribution (Dustmann et al., 2008) . To prevent "in-work-poverty", the reforms prepared the government to step in and pay supplementary benefits to low-income earners.
While the public was willing to accept rising inequalities and high levels of public expenditures as a prerequisite for economic recovery at a time of high unemployment, now that the recovery is there, this willingness diminishes. The Social Democrats (who govern in a grand coalition with the Christian Democrats and were responsible for the Agenda 2010), the Left Party and the labor unions use this window of opportunity and propose a statutory minimum wage. The proponents of minimum wages bring forward two main benefits of minimum wages. First, minimum wages can stop the downward pressure on wages for the low-skilled and possibly reverse the trend of rising wage inequality. Second, if low-skilled workers earn higher wages on the labor market, the government has to spend less on supplementary welfare benefits. By introducing minimum wages, one can apparently kill two birds with one stone.
Unfortunately, minimum wages would also kill a third bird one would like to keep alive: employment opportunities for low-skilled workers. To avoid this, Germany's neighbors often combine minimum wages with some type of wage subsidy that compensates firms for the burden the minimum wage imposes on them. In France, for instance, the government subsidizes employers' social security contributions up to the 1.6-fold of the minimum wage (see Kramarz and Philippon (2001) and for details). A similar program is in place in the Netherlands. The Dutch SPAK is a permanent reduction in employer's social security contributions for low paid workers up to 115 percent of the minimum wage (Mühlau and Salverda 2000 and de Mooij 2006) . A similar scheme has been implemented in Belgium (Marx 2001) .
Rather than using the subsidy as a complementary policy only, one may be inclined to consider it as a sensible policy without introducing a minimum wage in the first place.
Depending on whether the incidence of the subsidy falls on employers or employees, a wage subsidy could increase employment and/or the incomes of low-skilled workers without endangering their employment opportunities.
In this paper, we want to evaluate which of these three policy options may suit Germany best to simultaneously secure employment opportunities and sufficient incomes in the lowwage sector. After describing the current system of the German low-wage labor market in Section 2, we examine in Section 3 how the introduction of a statutory minimum wage would affect employment, wage inequality, public expenditures, and aggregate income in the German low-wage sector by using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). 1 We then use the same data to simulate the effects of combining minimum wages and wage subsidies (Section 4). In a last step, we analyze whether pure wage subsidies can be advantageous compared to pure minimum wages or a combination of both instruments (Section 5). Even though we use German data for our simulations, the policy analysis is sufficiently general to allow transferring our findings to other countries. This will be discussed in the concluding Section 6.
Germany's low wage sector
Until the mid-1990s, the German labor market was characterized by a rigid wage structure.
While the pressures of globalization and technological progress led to a widening of skillspecific wage structures in most industrialized countries, wage inequality did not increase in Germany. Keeping the wage structure stable despite downward pressures on the demand for low-skilled labor led to rising unemployment rates among the least skilled. While the unemployment rates of college graduates stayed at relatively low levels over the last 20 years, the unemployment rates of unskilled workers rose from 5.3 percent in 1976 to 21.7 percent in 2005 and 19.9 percent in 2006. It might not be surprising that the unemployment rate of the low-skilled exceeds the unemployment rate of better skilled workers but Germany's troubles to reintegrate its low-skilled workers are far worse than in other industrialized countries. 
Source: OECD (2008).
1 For a detailed description of the GSOEP, see Wagner et al. (2007) . Germany has the highest low-skilled unemployment rate among all these countries, both in absolute terms and relative to the general unemployment rate.
Another consequence of Germany's labor market rigidities has been a large degree of hysteresis of long-term unemployment. Figure 2 shows how short-term and long-term unemployment respond to business cycle movements (where for expositional reasons, we inverted the scale for the growth rates). In the left diagram, we plot the number of short-term unemployed against annual growth rates. The short-term unemployed have qualifications and skills that are demanded on the market, and their employment prospects react promptly to changes in growth rates. This has also been true in the latest upswing. Between October 2005
and October 2008, the number of short-term unemployed has fallen by almost 50 percent. The picture looks entirely different for the long-term unemployed (right diagram in Figure 2 ).
Long-term unemployment had been continuously increasing and appeared to be disconnected from the business cycle until 2005. At best, economic upswings in the last fifteen years had helped to decelerate the rise of long-term unemployment. 
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In the last couple of years, however, it seems like hysteresis has finally been overcome. For the first time, an economic upswing has resulted in a fall in the number of long-term unemployed. From January 2007 to October 2008, the number of long-term unemployed has fallen by 24.6 %. A prerequisite of this development was a loosening of the rigid German wage structure. Since the mid-1990s, the wage structure has become more dispersed at the bottom end (Gernandt and Pfeiffer 2007, Dustmann et al. 2008 At the same time, in-work-benefits were extended. According to the regulations of the German Social Code, a UB II recipient who takes up work is allowed to keep the first EUR 100 of his monthly gross wage income without facing any cut in his transfer payments. From the following EUR 700, he is allowed to keep 20 %, i.e. the transfer reduction rate within this income range is 80 %. The transfer reduction rate increases to 90 % for gross wages above EUR 800 and EUR 1,200 (resp. EUR 1,500 if there are children in the household). Any wage income above this level is deducted at 100 per cent from UB II until the public transfer is reduced to zero. Figure 3 shows how the net income of a single person and a household with two adults and two children changes with rising gross wage income.
The dashed vertical lines indicate the gross incomes at which the respective households leaves the public transfer system. This zero-transfer-line is at a gross wage of EUR 1,285 for a single person and at EUR 2,320 for a four-person household. As Figure 3 indicates, the incentive to take up employment is very small, in particular for full-time employment with incomes above EUR 800, where the transfer-reduction rate is at least 90 %. In the range from EUR 1,500 to EUR 2,320, additional gross labor income does not lead to any increase in a household's net income. Improved in-work-benefits are meant to "make work pay" for those willing to work. For the unwilling, the reform toughened potential sanctions if an unemployed persons does not actively try to return to employment. Jobseekers are obliged to accept any suitable job offer.
The definition of suitable work was broadened, so that sub-union wages must now be accepted. A person's availability for work can additionally be tested by training or workfare measures in the public sector.
Although it is still too early to draw definitive conclusions, the recent fall in unemployment suggests that the wage restraint of the last decade in addition to the recent labor market reforms were helpful in creating more jobs and reintegrating formerly marginalized groups into the labor market (Brenke and Zimmermann 2008) . Arbeit (2008) , in March 2008 a total of 1.3 million UB II recipients (about 25 % of all UB II recipients) had a wage income in addition to UB II, which is a plus of more than 400,000 compared to three years before.
According to the Statistik der Bundesagentur für
However, the tax-transfer-system creates strong incentives to work only part-time. As Figure 4 illustrates, almost 92 % of all single UB II recipients and 83 % of single parents who receive UB II and work earn less than EUR 500. Apparently, the current system creates strong incentives to take up only part-time work as long as one is eligible to UB II. A more differentiated picture emerges only for larger households in need. Around 45 % of couples with children have a gross income of more than EUR 500, i.e. most of them face an implicit marginal tax of 90 % and more. This indicates that a large group of transfer recipients is willing to work in spite of high transfer reduction rates -even in ranges where the implicit marginal income tax can be as large as 100 %. 2
The German minimum wage debate
The downside of this success is rising wage inequality. Gernandt and Pfeiffer (2007) show that wage inequality has risen since 1994 (while the wage distribution stayed constant in the preceding ten years), and that, in West Germany, wage inequality primarily occurred in the lower part of the wage distribution. Acemoglu (2003) and Dustmann et al. (2008) find that wage inequality had already risen in the 1980s, but only at the top of the wage distribution.
Wage inequality at the lower end has started to rise in the 1990s only.
Rising wage inequality was the bitter pill the German economy needed to swallow when unemployment was high. Since unemployment rates have started to fall in the latest economic upswing, however, it has become more difficult to convince wage setters that wages have to stay low. Rising employment figures have not only led to higher wage demands by unions, but also to the demand for a statutory minimum wage, with the main objective of avoiding inwork poverty. In the view of the minimum wage proponents, a person who works in a fulltime job should earn enough to secure a subsistence-level income without having to rely on supplementary welfare benefits.
Another argument brought forward in favor of minimum wages is that raising wages in the low-wage sector would alleviate the public budget. The recent fall in long-term unemployment was not accompanied by a similar fall in the number of UB II recipients.
While the number of unemployed UB II recipients has fallen by 24.4%, the total number of UB recipients only fell by 9% from January 2007 to October 2008. This is due to the fact that a rising number of workers in the low-skilled sector are eligible to supplementary transfers.
As the labor market situation has improved, more and more politicians have started to complain about this development -although it was intended by the Hartz-reforms and may be considered as one of their great successes. It should not be the case, the argument goes, that the government pays part of the wage bill in the low wage segment of the labor market. A minimum wage should be introduced to shift the burden away from the government towards the firms. This argument is brought forward, for example, by the German Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. It argues that, in August 2007, more than 1.2 million low-wage workers had to receive in-work benefits through the welfare system to secure their subsistence level. This costs the government about EUR 1.5 billion per year (cf. Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales 2008b). Even though it was the original intention of its labor market reforms to subsidize employment through in-work-benefits instead of subsidizing unemployment through welfare benefits, the Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs now calls this an "erroneous trend" that can only be overcome by minimum wages that shift part of the cost of the welfare system to firms.
Most of its proponents campaign for a minimum wage of EUR 7.50 per hour. 3 Such a statutory minimum wage is comparable to the levels observed in the UK and France (see The absolute value of an hourly minimum wage provides only limited information. To assess the minimum wage, it is more important to look at how it would fit into the existing wage distribution of a particular country. Here, the Kaitz index, which relates the minimum to the median wage, provides some insights. As Figure 6 shows, the Kaitz index for European the total workforce would be affected by an hourly minimum wage but with huge regional 4 For details, see Knabe and Schöb (2008) .
differences. While the respective figure for West Germany is 11.7 %, the figure for the East is substantially higher with 18.5 %. As Table 2 reports, 4.6 % of full-time employees are affected. This fraction is larger than in the UK (2.0 %) and the Netherlands (2.2 %), but it is much lower than the fraction of French full-time employees who are paid just the statutory minimum wage (9.0 %). 5 The share of full-time employees who have to rely on supplementary UB II -these are the main addressees of policies to fight in-work poverty -is substantially higher. More than every fourth UB II recipient who works full-time would be affected by the statutory minimum wage. The respective fraction of UB II recipients working part-time is 37.3 %, and of those holding a minijob, it is 86.7 %.
The employment effects are calculated by following the approach of Ragnitz and Thum (2007) who assume an iso-elastic labor demand elasticity of −0.75 for each wage bracket. 6 A statutory minimum wage would lead to a total loss of more than 840,000 jobs (see Table 2 , column 2), which corresponds to 2.6 % of the workforce. Almost one fourth of the job losses would occur in eastern Germany. This would imply a reduction of the East German work force by 3.8 %. For the main target group of a minimum wage -full-time workers -the employment effects are much smaller. Expected job losses are about 156,000 full-time workers, i.e. 0.7 % of all full-time employees. By contrast, about 77 % of the job losses hit employees with a minijob, pensioners, and students. Concerning those in need, we find that about 14,000 UB II recipients who work full-time would lose their job, while about 145.000
(23 %) of the UB II recipients with a minijob would lose their supplementary wage income.
Can the minimum wage at least make low-paid workers independent of supplementary public transfers? This is one of the core objectives of the minimum wage proponents. To answer this question, we first look at a representative single-person employee who currently works full-time (160 hours per month) for an hourly gross wage of EUR 5.00.
If the employee is entitled to supplementary UB II, the basic income when unemployed is EUR 685 per month (see Table 1 (2008) do, the output reaction plays a very minor role since the factor income share of those being affected by the minimum wage is rather small. If, by contrast, we assume that workers in each wage bracket produce a separate good, we need to know the output substitution elasticities. Looking at non-marginal changes in the lower income distribution thus would make any assumption about substitution elasticities -even if based on empirical estimates -highly speculative. Second, we also know very little about the incidence of a statutory wage rise. If better paid workers face relatively flexible wages, most of the substitution effect might be evaporated by wage reactions. 800, she is allowed to keep EUR 240 of her gross wage income so that her total net income would be EUR 925. If her gross hourly wage rises to EUR 7.50, she would still be entitled to supplementary UB II. Since in the income range from EUR 800 to EUR 1,200 the transfer reduction rate is 90 %, the monthly net income would merely rise by EUR 40
to EUR 965: a 50 % increase in the gross wage results in a mere 4.3 % rise in the net income.
If the employee is not entitled to UB II, the monthly net income would rise from EUR 644 to EUR 905, i.e. by 40.5 %.
As we have seen above, the minimum wage causes job losses. If an employee who receives supplementary UB II became unemployed, she would lose the EUR 240 she was allowed to keep from her gross wage income. Her monthly income would drop to EUR
(a 26 % reduction).
If an employee who is not entitled to UB II became unemployed after introducing the statutory minimum wage, her net income would fall from EUR 644 by 40 % to EUR 386 because she would receive UB I for the first twelve months. After this, she would not be entitled to any public transfers anymore. percent of employees fall below the "risk-of-poverty" threshold, but 43 percent of the unemployed do so. A statutory minimum wage thus runs the risk to worsen rather than improve Germany's poverty rate: in so far as the statutory minimum wage threatens low-paid jobs, it threatens to throw low-income workers, who are above the risk-of-poverty threshold as long as they are employed, below this threshold.
Figure 8: Net incomes and the risk of poverty
The aggregate figures presented in Table 2 II falls by 3.5 percent. As Figure 7 and the right column in Table 2 clearly indicate, a statutory minimum wage puts almost 170,000 employees with supplementary UB II benefits plus their family members into the risk of poverty, but fails to lift anyone in need out of it.
There are several effects on the government budget. On the one hand, increasing wage income raises taxes and social security contributions. Furthermore, as far as affected employees are entitled to supplementary UB II payments, these payments will be reduced.
These two effects increase fiscal revenues. On the other hand, the layoffs will lower tax revenues and social security contributions and will raise expenditures on unemployment benefit. 7 Summing up all effects, a statutory minimum wage of EUR 7.50 would increase the public deficit by more than EUR 4 billion per year. Thus, the statutory minimum wage also fails on this account: rather than alleviating the fiscal burden the minimum wage raises public debt.
Neutralizing the minimum wage: learning from the neighbors?
Despite the disillusioning results presented in the last section, one may nevertheless argue that the minimum wage can serve as a redistributive tool if one could only avoid the negative employment effects. The French approach of combining a minimum wage with a wage subsidy may offer a solution. The French statutory minimum wage SMIC (Salaire Minimum
Interprofessionnel de croissance) has a very strong effect on the labor costs of persons with low-skilled qualifications. This is reinforced by the high social security contribution rates of 40 % of the gross wage that the employers have to pay. To neutralize this effect at least partially, a subsidy of the employers' social security contributions was introduced in 1993.
Since January 2005, the subsidy is 26 % at the minimum wage and is then phased out linearly to the 1.6-fold of the minimum wage. 8 The wage subsidy (partly) compensates the firms for increases in the minimum wage.
An interesting feature of the French approach is that it entails an automatism that might even reduce firm's labor costs if the statutory minimum wage is raised over time. Figure 8 shows the change in labor cost when the statutory minimum wage is raised by 10 %. Of course, labor costs for employees who have received exactly the minimum wage increase.
Since the wage interval in which the subsidy is paid is shifted upwards, however, also higherpaying jobs become subject to subsidization. For wage levels between the former and the new minimum wage, the wages to be paid rise, but the subsidy to the employer rises, too. For wages above the new minimum wage, the only effect at work is the increase in the wage 7 For our calculations, we assume that all full-time and part-time employees who are laid off will receive UB I. If they received supplementary UB II even before becoming unemployed, they will receive the full UB II amount without any deductions. Persons formerly employed in a minijob who received supplementary UB II will continue to receive UB II; all other workers will not receive any public transfers when becoming unemployed. Other factor incomes are taxed at an average tax rate of 30 %. 8 For further details, see Sterdyniak (2007) .
subsidy that is due to the shift of the subsidy range. In sum, the labor costs for wages between 110 % and 160 % of the initial minimum wage decrease by around 5 % to 6 %. Wages between 160 and 176 per cent of the initial minimum wage now enter the subsidy zone, so that labor costs decrease in this range, too. The effect of the minimum wage on total labor cost are thus inconclusive. Source: Sterdyniak (2007) and own calculations. Laroque and Salanié (2000) examined the interaction of an increase in the minimum wage and the wage subsidy to employers for the year 1997 with regulations being slightly different from today's regulations. According to their simulations, a minimum wage increase of 10 % costs 290,000 jobs on a long-term basis. An extension of the subsidies, however, would create around 500,000 new jobs in return. These numbers are by all means in accordance with the results of studies stating an especially strong negative employment effect of the minimum wage among young workers without training (see Laroque and Salaniè 2002) .
We simulate how an adoption of the French approach would affect the impact of minimum wages in Germany. We endogenously determine the subsidy rate that completely neutralizes the minimum wage's adverse employment effects. The wage subsidy is highest at the minimum wage level and is then linearly decreased until it fades out at 150 % of the minimum wage. The endogenously determined maximum subsidy is 18.5 % (EUR 1.39 per hour). The subsidy phases out at a wage of EUR 11.25.
The cost of neutralizing the adverse employment effects of a minimum wage are immense. For a statutory minimum wage of EUR 7.50, the fiscal cost of the combined scheme adds up to EUR 15.6 billion per year, exceeding the fiscal cost of a pure minimum wage scheme by EUR 11.5 billion per year. Of course, the effect on household incomes is much stronger. Aggregate incomes of all households affected rise by EUR 4 billion per year compared to a pure minimum wage regime, which implies that the neutralizing scheme costs the government almost EUR 3 per Euro additional household income. This clearly indicates the inefficiency of a combined introduction of a high statutory minimum wage with neutralizing wage subsidies. The French model is -if at all -only suitable for moderate statutory minimum wages. 9 But even a moderate statutory minimum wage, accompanied by a wage subsidy, could open Pandora's box. Once introduced, there would be nothing that prevents politicians from demanding ever higher minimum wage levels (see Franz et al., 2008) . Table 3 shows how the combined measure affects households with an initial hourly wage below and above the statutory minimum wage. As expected, the wage subsidy can only partly revert the increase in labor cost below EUR 7.50 but it actually lowers labor cost in the range from EUR 7.50 to EUR 11.25 (cf. Figure 5 ). In total, the number of jobs falls by almost 3,000
because, by keeping the number of full-time equivalent jobs constant, more minijobs are lost than full-time jobs are created. The group of persons working in a minijob is the group that loses most jobs. Half of the aggregate income gain of EUR 5 billion per year accrues to full-time employees, the second largest share goes to persons with a minijob. Since the existing rules about supplementary UB II ensure that the potential gain from a minimum wage for UB II recipients is small while the income loss when laid off is much higher, full-time and part-time employees eligible for supplementary UB II hardly gain from this reform option. The only significant income effect is that less productive workers lose while those with higher productivity, ensuring a wage above the minimum wage, will benefit. UB II recipients who hold a low-paid minijob are the great losers with an annual loss of more than EUR 800 million. In total, the incomes of UB II recipients would fall so that even a minimum wage with accompanying employment-neutralizing measures fails to increase the income of the most important target group, i.e. the households in need. A neutralized minimum wage is thus not only extremely costly, it also does not raise the income of needy households.
Subsidizing low wages instead, or: going beyond Agenda 2010
Can the government do better? Why not apply a wage subsidy only? To analyze this alternative, we consider a similar wage subsidy as in the previous section: up to a certain wage rate, employers are fully exempted from social security contributions. This is equivalent to a 16.3 % subsidy on labor cost. Up to 150 % of the exemption limit, the employer contribution rates are then linearly increased until they reach the regular level of 19.5 % of the gross wage. We determine the exemption limit endogenously so that the subsidy scheme costs as much as the minimum wage, i.e. EUR 4 billion per year.
If the whole incidence of the subsidy falls on the employer, the cost-equivalent exemption limit is EUR 6.83. The positive employment effects are substantial. Total employment would rise by approximately 2.5 % of the total workforce or 800.000 workers. Aggregate household income is EUR 2.8 billion per year higher than in the minimum wage regime. The more the incidence falls on employees, the smaller is the employment effect because the wage subsidy has a lower impact on labor cost. Aggregate additional household income is almost stable at about EUR 4 billion per year, see Figure 9 . However, the distribution of the income gains changes. 
Source: own calculations
If the incidence falls entirely on employers, incomes of incumbent workers do not change, but some formerly unemployed persons get a job. Since wages in the low-wage sector hardly exceed the level of unemployment benefits of short-term unemployed or, in the case of UB II recipients, are subject to high transfer-reduction rates, the incomes of the new employees eligible to UB II do not rise very much. If the subsidy on social security contributions is fully shifted to employees, the cost-equivalent exemption limit would be EUR 5.65. In this case, employment stays constant, but incumbent employees benefit from a substantial net wage raise. Table 5 summarizes the main results of our simulations and shows that the pure wage subsidy, irrespective of the final incidence of the subsidy scheme, is superior to a statutory minimum wage: at the same fiscal cost, both employment and income effects are more favorable. The French approach provides slightly higher household incomes, but comes at a huge fiscal cost. These figures suggest to reconsider proposals that aim at going beyond the reforms of the Agenda 2010. These proposals favor a combined wage (Kombilohn): the wage bill is partly paid by the firm and partly by the government. These proposals can be separated into schemes similar to the US Earned Income Tax Credit program that subsidizes employees and schemes that aim to subsidize employers directly.
Which way to go?
The most prominent proposal of the former type is called Activating Welfare (Aktivierende Sozialhilfe), developed by the ifo-Institute (see Sinn et al. 2006 Sinn et al. , 2007 .
According to this proposal, the government should provide supplementary benefits to an extent that the first EUR 500 of the wage income are no longer deducted from the public transfers. In addition, a wage subsidy of 20 % of the first EUR 200 of the income is granted.
In return, the UB II is reduced by EUR 351 (only accommodation costs are provided). For low wages, both income and substitution effects would have a strong positive effect on labor supply and would thus increase wage pressure. For wages above EUR 500, the benefitreduction rate is significantly decreased and amounts to approximately 71 per cent -in contrast to 80 to 100 per cent according to the current regulations. In Figure 10 , the black line shows the net income a single person household receives depending on his gross earnings (without employer's social security contributions) according to Activating Welfare. Since the reduction of UB II would result in an income below the level of the basic income, each UB II recipient can secure a minimum income according to the current UB II regulations by working with a municipal employment society, a public works institution, or with a municipal temporary employment agency. The wage subsidy is thus accompanied by workfare elements that create strong incentives for those taking up a publicly subsidized job to look for better paid employment on the regular labor market.
The proposal of the German Council of Economic Experts (see Sachverständigenrat zur
Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung 2006a, b) is very similar in vein but puts a stronger focus on making low-paid full-time jobs more attractive. For this reason, the Council suggests to completely deduct the first EUR 200 of the gross income from UB II payments. In return, the possibilities to earn a supplementary income above the level of EUR deductions to cover income-related expenses. Additional income is subject to a transferreduction rate of 50 % up to EUR 800. Above EUR 800, the transfer-reduction rates are the same as in the current system. Like the ifo-Institute, the German Council of Economic
Experts also proposes a reduction of the current UB II, but at a smaller amount of only EUR 100, and suggests additional workfare measures. The grey line in Figure 10 shows the resulting net income for a single person household. Both proposals aim at reforming the existing systems by further improving in-work-benefits and adding workfare elements.
An alternative proposal suggests to directly subsidize labor costs. The Magdeburg Alternative suggests a permanent rebate of social security contributions for employers. In this respect, this proposal is close to the proposal discussed above. An employer who hires a UB II recipient with a wage below a maximum support limit is refunded the complete amount of the social security contributions, i.e. employee's and employer's contributions. For a gross income of EUR 1,000 per month, this is a refund of approx. EUR 400.
Basically, the Magdeburg Alternative proposes a target group-related subsidy and thus faces the risk that the scheme crowds out regularly employed and paid workers without creating new jobs. To avoid such a "revolving door effect", the subsidy is granted only for extra jobs within firms. Furthermore, to avoid the outsourcing of simple work to new firms and cheap wage competitors, existing firms receive not only a rebate of the social security contributions for a newly hired worker, but also for an already employed one. This "double subsidization" creates strong incentives for incumbent firms not to outsource low-paid work (see Schöb 2007 for a formal analysis).
Like the other wage subsidy proposals, the Magdeburg Alternative also suggests workfare elements to ensure that the stimulated labor demand meets sufficient labor supply. While the long-run impact of all these proposals is rather similar, the difference lies in their timing. The proponents of the Magdeburg Alternative favor wage subsidies to employers because they reduce wage cost immediately without having to wait until wage subsidies given to employees are transformed into lower gross wages.
When the new German government after the 2009 election has to decide which way to go, it should be aware that, whichever of these wage subsidy proposals one prefers, the results in Table 5 clarify that all of them -being allocatively rather similar in the long-run -are superior to a minimum wage. If the government introduced a minimum wage, it would reduce employment opportunities for the low-skilled and raise public expenditures on unemployment and welfare benefits. If the government is willing to spend the same amount of money directly on wage subsidies, it could achieve more favorable employment and income effects than with minimum wages. If it uses the subsidy to neutralize the adverse effects of a minimum wage, the government would forgo employment opportunities and only realize small income gains at huge fiscal cost. Hence, the government should keep its hands off minimum wages altogether and proceed further on the route taken by Agenda 2010: the more efficient way for the welfare state to fulfill its responsibility of ensuring sufficient incomes and employment prospects for those in need is to implement policies to subsidize low-paid jobs directly.
